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ESTUARINE LAND OF NORTH CAROLINA:




The vast estuarine areas of North Carolina-"those coastal
complexes where fresh water from the land meets the salt water of
the sea with a daily tidal flux"'-are exceeded in total area only by
those of Alaska and Louisiana.' Estuarine areas include bays,
sounds, harbors, lagoons, tidal or salt marshes, coasts, and inshore
waters in which the salt waters of the ocean meet and are diluted
by the fresh waters of the inland rivers. In North Carolina, this en-
compasses extensive coastal sounds, salt marshes, and broad river
mouths exceeding 2,200,000 acres.3 These areas are one of North
Carolina's most valuable resources.
Estuarine areas and their preservation from spoilage are es-
sential to a wide variety of fish and wildlife resources, all of
which are important to the State not only in terms of resource con-
servation as such, but also as significant factors in its economy.'
Activities in North Carolina as well as in other states, however, have
already compromised the continuing quality and value of estuarine
f A.B., University of Wisconsin; LL.B., Columbia University; Assistant
Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. This article is a
product of a continuing research project in estuarine conservation and
management being conducted by the Institute of Government (University
of North Carolina) under the supervision of Professor Milton S. Heath, Jr.
The project is aided by a grant from the Belle Baruch Foundation.
I Statement of Dr. Stanley A. Cain in Hearings on H.R. 25 Before the
Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House Com-
mittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings].
2Id. at 30 (information contained in table compiled by Fish and Wildlife
Service of the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife).
3Id.
'In 1966, the commercial fisheries of North Carolina produced 244,909,000
pounds of an assorted variety of fish with a total dockside value of 9,532,000
dollars. North Carolina Commercial Fisheries Newsletter 3 (Spring 1967).
These figures in no way encompass the economic impact of sport fishing and
the broad variety of expenditures connected therewith. Nor do they account
for the economic impact of the processing and marketing of commercial
fishery products.
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resources. The Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife of the
U. S. Department of the Interior reported in March, 1967, that
approximately 22,000 acres of basic estuarine habitat had already
been lost in North Carolina through dredging and filling,' and,
presumably, this does not account for effective losses in proximate
estuarine areas resulting from changes in water flow and alteration
of preexisting physical, chemical, or microbiological characteristics
of the waters caused by the dredging and filling operations.' Al-
though navigation improvement is reported to be the most common
reason for dredging and filling, the greatest impact upon estuarine
lands, waters, and resources is probably caused by mass housing
developments which appear with increasing frequency along the
Atlantic coast.
7
Conservation and protection of the remaining unspoiled estuarine
areas of North Carolina as well as the return to productive use of
already polluted areas is presently hampered by heretofore un-
resolved controversies over ownership and use of estuarine lands.
Although North Carolina presently has at its disposal some measures
permitting control of water pollution" and registration of marsh-
land dredging activities' that adversely affect the strong public in-
terest in its extensive sounds, salt marshes, bays, and inshore waters,
it is important to know whether any given estuarine lands are
publicly or privately owned. To the extent that they are pri-
vately owned, North Carolina may be severely limited in its ability
to cope with the increasing impact of private activity on the estuarine
resources of the State. It is with this in mind that this study
undertakes to examine the legal history of estuarine ownership and
use in North Carolina from the time of settlement to the present
with a view to providing a backdrop against which title claims to
'Hearings 30.
'Id. The statement of Dr. Cain, who presented the results of the survey
of estuarine lands, indicated that it was not the purpose of the study "to
dwell on the loss of estuarine productivity that results from pollution of the
water by soluble and solid wastes, but to consider those changes produced by
man (including sedimentation) that drastically reduce the acreage of
estuarine marshes and open water."
"Id. at 31.
'See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-214.1, -215.1 (Supp. 1967).
'The 1967 General Assembly enacted legislation requiring registration
with the Department of Water and Air Resources of dredges and other earth.
moving equipment used in certain coastal areas. As originally introduced,




estuarine lands may be evaluated and future action for the preserva-
tion of estuarine resources may be taken.
HISTORY OF ESTUARINE OWNERSHIP,
USE AND CONTROL
Common Law and Colonial Origins
Long before Magna Carta-probably at about the time of the
Norman Conquest-the English Crown claimed ownership of the
territorial seas as far as their tidal reaches as well as the tidelands
and the fish in tidal waters."0 The title of the King was jus
privatum, that is, of a personal proprietary nature, so that he was
possessed with the authority to favor a subject with an exclusive
grant of rights or privileges in or upon these waters and lands as
well as in the lands not covered by tidal waters.
Although the law in this early stage of development recognized
the King's power to convey an interest in tidelands as well as in all
other land, the law admitted an important distinction between the
two classes of land, a variance which guided further development of
the common law. Even though the Crown was deemed to own the
ungranted high lands adjacent to tidal waters and the land beneath
those waters, a grant of a manor on high land did not, as a general
rule, operate as a conveyance of the adjacent submerged land.11
However, this rule did not pertain to a grant of land adjacent to
non-tidal waters; a Crown grant of high land adjacent to non-tidal
waters, absent specific exclusion by terms of the grant, also vested
the riparian owner with title to the land beneath those waters.12
Ownership of land on one bank of a stream gave the landowner
title to the bed of the stream as far as its thread and ownership of
both banks carried with the grants the riparian ownership of the
entire bed of the stream."3
In the course of time, the legal concepts relating to the owner-
ship of the English tidelands were refined and, though the source of
change is still a subject of scholarly dispute, the common law was
1I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 35.2(A), at 181 (Clark ed. 1967)
[hereinafter cited as CLARK].
" Sir Henry Constable's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 106a, 77 Eng. Rep. 218 (K.B.
1601).
"0Rex v. Smith, 2 Doug. 441, 99 Eng. Rep. 283 (K.B. 1780); Carter v.
Murcot, 4 Bur. 2162, 98 Eng. Rep. 127 (K.B. 1768).
"3 Cases cited note 12 supra.
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significantly altered long before the settlement of North America.
The refinement of the law posits that the King's title to various
lands was of two distinct types, i.e., that some lands were jus
privatum and others were jus publicum. The former category en-
compassed the private proprietary lands of the King and were freely
alienable while the latter were held by the King for the benefit of
the whole community in common and could not be conveyed to a
private individual. Although it has been argued that the limitation
upon the power to grant jus publicum lands did not actually originate
with the Magna Carta, 4 it is now established in English law that
after Magna Carta the King could no longer dispose of jus publicum
lands.' 5
Tidelands fell within the jus publicum category of lands held in
public trust. The purpose of the trust was protection of the English
homeland and the preservation of the common rights of navigation
and fishery in the waters of the kingdom. It should be noted, how-
ever, that this development in the law neither prejudiced preexisting
Crown grants nor absolutely barred the acquisition of title to these
lands by a private person; so-called "ancient grants," those made
prior to the signing of the Magna Carta, remained valid'0 and
Parliament, in its capacity as the representative of the English
people, could convey jus publicum land on behalf of the people who
were the beneficiaries of the King's public trust.
7
The problem of determining whether a conveyance of high land
also conveyed some part of the shore or tideland was always of some
moment in England since, even before the refinement of the com-
mon law principles relating to ownership of the tidelands, there
was a need to ascertain the extent of the King's grants. The need
for resolving this question became more acute, however, following
the division of the King's title into two separate categories since the
law was thereafter dealing with a conflict between private and pub-
"' See generally CLARK §§ 35-36; 2 H. FARNHAM, WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS § 368, at 1361 (1904) [hereinafter cited as FARNHAM].
'" Neil v. Duke of Devonshire, 8 App. Cas. 135 (1882); The Duke of
Somerset v. Fogivell, 5 Barn. & Cress. 875, 108 Eng. Rep. 325 (K.B. 1826).
" Cases cited note 15 supra. See also The Royal Fishery of the Banne,
Davis 55, 80 Eng. Rep. 540 (P.C. 1610) (Ire.).
"'FARNHAM § 368a, at 1361. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1893);
State v. Leavitt, 105 Me. 76, 72 A. 875 (1909); Wooley v. Campbell, 37
N.J.L. 163 (Sup. Ct. 1874).
[Vol. 46
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lic rights rather than a private controversy between the King and
his subject over the terms of their private contract.
In 1601, Sir Henry Constable's Case'" held that a Crown grant
of land upon the seacoast was, under the general rule, a conveyance
of only those lands above the high water mark. This rule applied
to lands situated on the seacoast and royal rivers which, according
to the 1604 decision in The Royal Fishery of the Banne,19 included
"[e]very navigable river, so high as the sea flows and ebbs in
it. . . ." The high water mark itself was determined by "the line of
the medium high tide between the springs and the neaps" on the
theory that the land below that line was "not capable of ordinary
cultivation or occupation" while the land above that line was "for
the most part dry and maniorable."2 Royal waters, both coastal
and inland, were waters in which the public, because of their jus
publicum character had a common right of both navigation and
fishery. The unabridgeable common right of navigation extended
to encompass other waters in which the tide did not ebb and
flow, i.e., non-tidal navigable waters, although the law did not allow
private persons to receive grants conveying lands lying beneath these
non-tidal waters.2" It was also possible to receive from the Crown
an exclusive or several fishery in non-tidal navigable waters, but
such rights were subject to the paramount common right to use the
river or stream for navigation.
22
The common law of England distinguished between jus priziatum
and jus publicum lands on the basis of whether or not the waters
covering the land were tidal or non-tidal rather than by deciding
if the waters were navigable or non-navigable. This is made entirely
clear from the language employed by the court in The Royal Fishery
of the Banne ;23 it is even more apparent when that decision is viewed
against subsequent English cases in which the common right of
navigation upon non-tidal waters was upheld. 4 Thus, although
" 5 Co. Rep. 106a, 77 Eng. Rep. 218 (K.B. 1601).
" Davis 55, 80 Eng. Rep. 540 (P.C. 1610) (Ire.).
- Attorney General v. Chambers, 4 de G. M. & G. 206, 217, 43 Eng.
Rep. 486 (Ch. 1854).
'Blount v. Layard, [1891] 2 Ch. 681; Leconfield v. Lonsdale, L.R.
5 C.P. 657 (1870).
"See, e.g., the commissioner's report in Leconfield v. Lonsdale, L.R.
5 C.P. 657, 658-62 (1870). See also Fitzwalter's Case, 1 Mod. 106, 86 Eng.
Rep. 766 (K.B. 1673).2 Davis 55, 80 Eng. Rep. 540 (P.C. 1610) (Ire.).
2 Cases cited note 21 supra.
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early decisions in the United States 5 declared that The Royal Fishery
of the Banne defined navigable waters in terms of the ebb and flow
of the tide, it can be fairly stated that this has probably never been the
English rule. 6 The ebb and flow rule in the English common law
was used only to determine the capacity in which the Crown held
title to lands but defined neither the capacity of the waters for navi-
gation nor the navigation rights of the public in those waters. 27 On
the other hand, the ebb and flow concept did have something to do
with fishery rights; it became impossible under the jus publicurn
theory for the Crown to grant an exclusive or several fishery in royal
waters, but such rights could be obtained in all other waters either
by a specific Crown patent 2s or by virtue of riparian ownership of
lands located on non-tidal streams.2 9
The colonial period provides few, if any, clues to the law con-
cerning estuarine lands. In 1663 Charles II granted to the Lords
Proprietors the lands which comprise North and South Carolina,
"together with all and singular ports, harbors, bays, rivers, isles,
and islets ... situate or being within the bounds or limits last before
mentioned ... the fishings of all sorts of fish, whales, sturgeons, and
all other royal fish in the sea, bays, islets and rivers ... together with
the royalty of the sea upon the coast. .. ."0 It is important to note
that the Proprietors, in accordance with long-standing legal doctrines,
could obtain no greater title to the granted lands than those possessed
"Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Caines 307, 2 Am. Dec. 270 (N.Y. 1805).
"Further discussion of this theory may be found in 2 A. SHALOWITZ,
SHORE & SEA BOUNDARIES 519 (1964). See also FARNHAM § 23e, at 112-17.
" Compare Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Caines 307, 2 Am. Dec. 270 (N.Y.
1805) with The Royal Fishery of the Banne, Davis 55, 80 Eng. Rep. 540
(P.C. 1610) (Ire.) and Blount v. Layard, [1891] 2 Ch. 681.
" See, e.g., The Royal Fishery of the Banne, Davis 55, 80 Eng. Rep. 540
(P.C. 1610) (Ire.).
"Cases cited notes 21 & 22 supra, and accompanying text.
'oIIREDELL, LAWS OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 1715-1790 1 (1791)
[hereinafter cited as IREDELL]. Most of the land titles in North Carolina are
ultimately derived from the 1663 grant to the Lords Proprietors. There
were, of course, earlier grants. Sir Walter Raleigh, in 1584, and Sir Robert
Heath, in 1629, received grants which included present-day North Carolina
from the Crown; both, however, forfeited their grants and neither passed
valid title to any lands in North Carolina. 1 COLONIAL REcoRDs OF NORTH
CAROLINA 42 (1886). Some titles in the Albemarle Sound region may be
traced back to grants from the London Company which colonized Virginia
in the early 1600's. HARRISON, VIRGINIA LAND GRANTS 19 (1925).
The Charter of 1663 expressly provided that the grant to the Lords Pro.
prietors did not limit or affect the title of settlers in the Albemarle who had
received grants from the Virginia Colony. InEDFLI 5.
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by the Crown.3 Thus the common law limitations on the power of the
King to grant certain lands, limitations well established before 1663,
also limited the Proprietors in such a way that they could not con-
vey the 'us publicum lands beneath tidal waters to private indi-
viduals.32 It might be assumed that the ebb and flow doctrine was the
test for jus publicum lands, since the English common law generally
applied in the colonies.3 3 It is important to note, however, that the
common law was adopted only so far as it was applicable to condi-
tions in the colonies; if it was found that the reason for a common
law principle had ceased to exist, the principle was changed to com-
port with reason.3 4 Later portions of this study undertake to analyze
subsequent judicial decisions with a view to obtaining at least some
guidance concerning the law which was applicable during the colonial
period. The statutes enacted by the colonial assembly provide little
guidance in this area; the basic purpose of the various acts was
clearly limited to the establishment of procedures for the orderly
disposition of land rather than the codification of more funda-
mental common law and statutory rules pertaining to public and
private ownership of real property.3 5
" FARNHAM § 368b, at 1363; Martin v. Wadell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 367, 413-14 (1842).
" Cases cited note 31 supra.
"N.C. Laws 1711, ch. 1.
" The old common law maxim, "Ratio est legis anima; inutata legis
ratione mutatur et lex" (Reason is the soul of the law; the reason of law
being changed the law is also changed), serves as the basis for rejecting
certain portions of the English common law as inapplicable to conditions in
North Carolina. See Rollison v. Hicks, 233 N.C. 99, 105, 63 S.E.2d 190,
195 (1951).
"See, e.g., N.C. Laws 1748, ch. 4; N.C. Laws 1715, chs. 29, 33. Ap-
parently the only statute enacted by the colonial assembly which specifically
pertained to acquisition of title to estuarine lands was N.C. Laws 1715,
ch. 29, § 3:
[N]o Person whatsoever shall take up any Marsh, Swamp, or sunken
Lands, but shall first give Notice, in writing, to the Owner of the Land
adjoining; After Notice delivered in writing before Evidence, such
Person or Persons shall have six months Time to resolve whether he
will take up the same or no; and in Case he shall not, before the End
of the said six Months, take out a Warrant to survey such Marsh,
Swamp, or sunken Land, as shall be contiguous to his own Land, then
the first Person who gave such Notice may survey and patent the same.
According to Iredell, this chapter was repealed, but he could find no record
of its repeal. IREDELL 15 n.(a).
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State Regulation
(1) 1777-1868
Lands not granted by the Crown or the Proprietors prior to
July 4, 1776, were opened to entry by the General Assembly in 1777.
Although the entry and grant statute failed to distinguish between
estuarine and other types of land, it did establish the basic system
governing the disposition of marsh and swamp lands for many years
to come-the entry and grant laws which pertained in North Carolina
until the 1959 revision of the State Lands statutes. The 1777 statute
contained a wide variety of provisions ranging from those estab-
lishing the procedures for electing entry-takers and surveyors to
those setting forth the procedures for making an entry and obtaining
a grant. In the latter category, the act required the filing of an entry
with the entry-taker, survey of the land, return of the survey to the
Secretary of State, and issuance of a grant by the Secretary of State.
With reference to the methods of survey, the statute provided that in
surveys of lands on navigable waters "the Water shall form one
Side of the Survey, and the Breadth on such Water shall not be more
than one fourth Part of the Distance back from the Water."' 8 En-
tries were limited to six hundred and forty acres except that up to
one thousand acres could be entered if the land was situated between
the lines of lands already surveyed and laid out for another person.
The entry and grant statute of 1777 did not distinguish between
estuarine and other types of land, nor did it define the term "navi-
gable water." The language set forth by quotation in the preceding
paragraph might well be interpreted to permit entry to land covered
by navigable water by persons entering the adjacent high land, but
the Supreme Court of North Carolina in a case dealing with an 1807
State grant, declared that neither the 1715 nor 1777 statutes per-
mitted entry to any land lying beneath navigable water "not by
reason of any express prohibition in that act, but being necessary for
public purposes as common highways for the convenience of all,
they [navigable waters] are fairly presumed not to have been within
the intention of the legislature. 3T It is not clear from the opinion
of the court whether the decision followed the leading case of Palmer
v. Mulligan88 in applying the ebb and flow rule in ascertaining the
"N.C. Laws 1777, ch. I, § X (2d Sess.).
17 Tatum v. Sawyer, 9 N.C. 226, 229 (1823).
" 3 Caines 307, 2 Am. Dec. 270 (N.Y. 1805).
[Vol. 46
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navigability of the waters near Currituck Inlet, although the case
reporter's preliminary notes on the parties' statements did make ref-
erence to the fact that the tide ebbed and flowed in the waters cover-
ing the marsh land in question.39
1825 brought significant changes in the State lands statutes, par-
ticularly in the laws governing the disposition of salt marshes and
other swamplands. In that year, the proceeds from the sale of these
lands were earmarked for the Literary Fund established for the sup-
port of the common schools." The Literary Board was given con-
trol over the marsh and swamp lands and their disposition,41 but
entry was confined to tracts of marsh and swamp lands not exceeding
fifty acres in area which were located between the lines of previously
granted lands.42 The 1830-1831 General Assembly subsequently
amended the 1825 fifty acre limitation upon entry by providing in
addition for the filing of an entry to marsh and swamp lands "when
the quantity of land in any one marsh does not exceed two thousand
acres" if the land involved had not already been surveyed by the
State for purposes of drainage and reclamation. 3 Thus, after passage
of the amendment, only two classes of marsh land could be entered:
that which was either a tract of not more than fifty acres situated
between the lines of previously entered and surveyed land, or land
situated in one marsh not exceeding 2,000 acres in area which had
not yet been surveyed by the State. All other entries were made null
and void and, could not be relied upon to support a title claim.44
The Literary Board was reorganized and the entry law somewhat
revised in 1837. The Board, in anticipation of large State receipts
from the Federal Government's sale of public lands, was allotted
substantial funds and granted broader powers to be used in- the
drainage, reclamation, and sale of marsh and swamp lands.4 5 The
revised statutes retained the 1825 and 1831 limitations upon entry
to estuarine lands but again failed to define the term "marsh and
swamp lands." The 1837 revisal, however, did vest the Board with the
authority to sell its reclaimed estuarine lands at public auction with-
30 9 N.C. at 226-27.
" N.C. Laws 1825, ch. 1.
'91Id.
" N.C. Laws 1826, ch. 6.
"N.C. Laws 1830-31, ch. 12.
"N.C. Laws 1777, ch. I, § X.
N.C. Laws 1836-37, ch. 23 POMEROY & Yono, NORTH CAROLINA
LANDS 99 (1964).
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out regard to the limitations contained in the entry and grant laws.40
It is important to note that the 1836-37 General Assembly omitted,
presumably through inadvertence, those provisions of the 1715 and
1777 statutes prescribing the methods to be employed in surveying
lands located on navigable waters. In 1846, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina held that an 1839 Literary Board grant of land
lying beneath non-tidal waters navigated by commercial and pleasure
vessels was valid; the court reverted to the common law tidal rule
because of the 1837 statutory omission of the survey provisions. The
decision in Hatfield v. Grimsted"' is not, however, inconsistent with
that of the court in Tatum v. Sawyer,4 the case in which the court
declared that land beneath navigable water could not be entered even
though the 1715 and 1777 statutes did not expressly bar such entries.
Rather, Hatfield v. Grimsted is of particular interest because it ap-
plied the English common law ebb and flow rule of navigability
without reference to or consideration of two earlier decisions in
which the court declared that the English common law rule was in-
applicable in North Carolina due to the variance between the nature
of the waters of England and those of this State. The omission in
the 1837 statutory revisal was corrected by legislation enacted in
1846 and effective in early 1847, but it has since been stated by the
courts that land beneath all non-tidal waters could be entered and
granted during the ten year period between 1837 and 1847."9
There was little subsequent change in the entry and grant laws
or the authority of the Literary Board prior to the Civil War ex-
cept for the 1854 statutory provision allowing owners of land ad-
jacent to navigable waters to enter the submerged lands as far out
as deep water for purposes of constructing wharves. 0 This privilege
extended only to the actual owners of the high land 1 and the statutes
authorizing such entries have been interpreted to mean that the land
owners have an easement in the entered tidelands rather than a fee
simple title. 2
"N.C. Laws 1836-37, ch. 23.
,729 N.C. 139 (1846).
489 N.C. 226 (1823).
'
9 See, e.g., Swan Island Club, Inc. v. White, 114 F. Supp. 95, 103
(E.D.N.C. 1953), aff'd sub nom., Swan Island Club, Inc. v. Yarborough,
209 F.2d 698 (4th Cir. 1954); Development Co. v. Parmele, 235 N.C. 689,
71 S.E.2d 474 (1952).
"N.C. Laws 1854-55, ch. 18, § 1.
: 1 Zimmerman v. Robinson, 114 N.C. 39, 19 S.E. 102 (1894).
'Railroad Co. v. Way, 172 N.C. 774, 90 S.E. 937 (1916); Land Co.
v. Hotel Co., 132 N.C. 366, 46 S.E. 749 (1903).
[Vol. 46
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In 1859, the General Assembly focused on an additional area of
regulation relevant to this study-oyster and clam bed licensing.
Chapter 33 of the Public Laws of 1858-1859 established a scheme
under which it became possible for private persons to obtain a
license to make or lay down oyster and clam beds for the purposes
of planting, cultivating and harvesting oysters and clams. The
statute did not allow any private individual to obtain a license for
the exclusive use of natural beds, but a license for use of other
areas created an exclusive alienable privilege which was forfeitable
by the licensee, his assigns or his heirs only upon failure to use or
properly stake out the bed for any continuous two year period. It
would appear likely that these licenses would (if the terms of the
licenses and the statute under which they were issued have not been
breached) still be valid today under the rationale of Oglesby v.
Adams, 3 the recent decision declaring that certain portions of the
oyster lease statutes enacted by the 1965 General Assembly were
unconstitutional abridgments of contract obligations of the State
to private parties.
During the War between the States, the system of common
schools collapsed. Since State disposition of marsh and swamp lands
was so closely linked with the common schools and the Literary
Fund, there is also a corresponding gap in the history of the law
relating to estuarine lands.
(2) 1868-1959
The North Carolina Constitution of 1868 provided that "the
net proceeds of all swamp lands belonging to the State" should,
along with other specified funds and revenues, be employed solely
for the establishment and maintenance of a public school system.5"
Control of these lands was placed with the newly created State Board
of Education which also administered the Literary Fund under the
terms of the pre-war statutes pertaining to the disposition of marsh
and swamp lands. The Board of Education harbored some doubts
concerning the extent of the swamp lands owned by the State and,
at the request of the Board, a report concerning these lands was filed
in 1883. That report stated in part that "[i]t is not certain that the
Board holds a single acre of these lands by an undoubted title,"55
and, in 1887, the Board adopted a policy of making no outright sales
" 268 N.C. 272, 150 S.E.2d 383 (1966).
"N.C. CONST. OF 1868 art. IX, § 4.
ERR, REPORTS ON THE LANDS Or NORTH CAROLINA (1883).
1968]
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of these lands until a survey was made to establish which land was
subject to entry or sale. 6 The request of the Board to embody this
policy in a statute was not, however, honored by the General As-
sembly. The survey itself was, despite the failure of the General
Assembly to create a moratorium in the disposition of marsh and
swamp lands, undertaken for the Board by the State Geological and
Economic Survey and in 1908 the completed report declared that the
State probably owned less than 100,000 acres of marsh and swamp
land. 7
There was little change in the entry and grant statutes at any
time between 1868 and 1959, at least so far as the law concerned
marsh and swamp lands. There were some amendments to the
statutes allowing entry to navigable waters for purposes of wharf
construction58 and a statute permitting entry of and grants to
phosphate beds lying beneath navigable waters was ratified in 1891.50
The phosphate bed grant was for a term of twenty-five years and
was forfeitable upon failure to mine, dig, or remove phosphate rock
for two years.6" The laws relating to the use of submerged lands
as oyster and clam beds were also amended during this period. In
1887, the General Assembly enacted a law declaring a moratorium
on the issuance of oyster and clam bed licenses in those waters south
of Roanoke and Croatan Sounds and north of Core Sound-in es-
sence, the general area of Pamlico Sound-until the area was sur-
veyed for purposes of mapping and staking out natural beds.01
Following completion of the so-called Winslow Survey on file in the
State Archives, private persons were allowed to enter all parts of
the surveyed area not staked out as natural beds by complying with
the provisions of the entry statutes. 2 Instead of receiving a grant
from the State, those who filed entries were given a document by
which the Secretary of State issued a perpetual franchise for the
exclusive use of the bottom which was entered.( 3 The statute
required that the franchisee make "in good faith within five years
from the day of obtaining said franchise an actual effort to raise and
"Legislative Documents of N.C. 1887, No. 17.
" POMEROY & YoHo, note 45 supra, at 110.8 E.g., N.C. Laws 1891, ch. 532.
.C. Laws 1891, ch. 476.
00 Id., §§ 3, 5.





cultivate shell-fish on said grounds." 64 These franchises, as well as
the earlier exclusive licenses, would appear to be protectable today
under the decision of the court in Oglesby v. Adams.65
All marsh and swamp land titles conveyed prior to April 23,
1953 by the Literary Fund, Literary Board, State Board of ]Educa-
tion or by the State for lands situated in New Hanover, Onslowv,
and Pender Counties were validated by Chapter 966 of the 1953
Session Laws. The statute declared that the title to marsh and swamp
lands held by the grantees or their successors in interest was as full
and complete as that which the original conveyances purported to
grant and made all laws in conflict with this confirmation of title in-
operative in the three counties to the extent that those laws could be
used as a basis for challenging such titles. The terms of the statute
are sufficiently specific to support the argument that the act does not
cover lands beneath navigable waters running through the marsh
lands. This is the only legislation that could be found which spe-
cifically confirms marsh and swamp land titles or title to lands gen-
erally situated in counties comprised in part of estuarine lands.66
The statute was relied upon in Parmele v. Eaton67 in 1954, but it
does not appear from the opinion of the court that the validity
of the statute was questioned. It has, however, been held that the
General Assembly may not revive void deeds of gift by a validation
statute where the law originally provided that all deeds of gift not
registered within two years are void.6 The present situation is not
identical, but does involve subsequent validation of deeds and grants
0
'Id.
268 N.C. 272, 150 S.E.2d 383 (1966). See also notes 77-79 infra, and
accompanying text.
"0 Other validation statutes pertaining to land in other than estuarine areas
have also been enacted. See, e.g., N.C. Laws 1887, ch. 201; N.C. Laws
1868-69, ch. 71.
1240 N.C. 539, 83 S.E.2d 93 (1954). The Court stated therein that "We
rest [our] decision on the findings of fact which bring the conveyances
made by the State Board of Education. . . within the purview of the statutes
authorizing and validating sales and conveyances of marsh or swamp lands."
Id. at 545, 83 S.E.2d at 97.
"Cutts v. McGhee, 221 N.C. 465, 20 S.E.2d 376 (1942); Booth v.
Hairston, 195 N.C. 8, 141 S.E. 480 (1928). Grants made contrary to the
provisions of the statutes permitting entry are void. See, e.g., N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 146-39 (1964) and N.C. Laws 1777, ch. I, § IX. This rule applies,
however, only to fundamental aspects of the law; other sections of the
statute provide for correction of errors such as entry in the wrong county
(N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-48 (1964)), errors made by the surveyor (N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 146-49 (1964)), or use of a wrong number, name or words in
the grant (N.C. GEx. STAT. § 146-52 (1964)). On the other hand, an entry
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which were void at issue due to non-conformity with substantive
rather than mere technical requirements; to that extent it is analogous
to the deed of gift cases. Moreover, it seems clear that the statute
cannot operate to divest title otherwise properly obtained by parties
other than those relying upon the validation statute.0
(3) 1959-1967
Effective June 2, 1959, North Carolina abolished the entry and
grant system and shifted completely to a statutory scheme which
provides for the direct sale or lease of State lands. The new statute
prescribed the terms upon which the State Department of Admin-
istration could sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the various cate-
gories of State lands.
70
The State Lands Act (N.C. GEN. STAT. Ch 146 (1964)) does
not, as did past statutes, treat the several types of state-owned lands
as mere varieties of "vacant and unappropriated lands," but sep-
arately defines in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-64 (1964), three sub-cate-
gories of state lands including submerged lands, swamp lands, and
vacant and unappropriated lands in such a manner that it appears
clear that these sub-categories are intended to be mutually exclusive.
The first of the sub-categories listed in the preceding paragraph,
submerged lands, is defined as
.. State lands which lie beneath
a. Any navigable waters within the boundaries of this State, or
b. The Atlantic Ocean to a distance of three geographical miles
seaward from the coastline of this State.71
and grant to lands in one marsh exceeding 2,000 acres is void. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Roanoke R.R. Co., 158 N.C. 313, 73 S.E. 994 (1912). Cf. Insurance
Co. v. Parmele, 214 N.C. 63, 197 S.E. 714 (1938) (re direct sale of lands
situate in one marsh exceeding 2,000 acres).
"9 E.g., even if lands lying in one marsh exceeding 2,000 acres could not
be entered, they could be sold by the State Board of Education. State Bd.
of Educ. v. Roanoke R.R. & Lumber Co., 158 N.C. 313, 73 S.E. 994 (1912).
See also Insurance Co. v. Parmele, 214 N.C. 63, 197 S.E. 714 (1938). In such
a case, the rule of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-39 (1964), that junior grants are
void and not even color of title, would seem to be inapplicable since there
would be no valid senior grant in existence. Cf. Lovin v. Carver, 150 N.C.
710, 64 S.E. 775 (1911), wherein the court discusses the effect of a State
grant which is void for vagueness of its description in a situation where a
junior grantee asserts the preference of his claim because the vague grant
and entry provided no notice of ownership.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-4 (1964).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-64(7) (1964).
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The statute defines navigable waters as "all waters which are navi-
gable in fact."7 2 Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-3 (1964) sub-
merged lands may not be conveyed in fee, but the act does permit
the grant of an easement in such lands under conditions deemed
proper by the Department with the approval of the Governor and
Council of State.7 The class of lands known as vacant and unap-
propriated lands includes all other State lands with the exception of
swamp lands.7 4 Under N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 146-3, -4 (1964) both
vacant and unappropriated lands and swamp lands may be sold in fee,
with the exception of State-owned natural lakes fifty acres in extent
or larger. Swamp lands are, however, the subject of special treatment
in several respects and, therefore, separately defined in N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 146-64 (1964) as:
... lands too wet for cultivation except by drainage, and includes
a. All State lands which have been or are known as "swamp"
or "marsh" lands, "pocosin bay," "briary bay," or "savanna,"
and which are part of one swamp exceeding 2,000 acres in area,
or which are a part of one swamp 2,000 acres or less in area
which has been surveyed by the State; and
b. All State lands which are covered by the waters of any State-
owned lake or pond.7 5
The new statutory definition of swamp lands was obviously de-
signed to bring together in one category all of those lands for which
a grant or deed could be obtained from the State Board of Educa-
tion, i.e., both marsh lands which could be entered and those that
could be sold. This definition, however, omits that category of marsh
and swamp land which, after the 1831 amendment to the entry and
grant statute, was the most open to entry-land lying in one swamp
of 2,000 acres or less which had not been surveyed by the State.
Oversight may be the cause for the omission of certain swamp lands
from the statutory definition; there is no apparent purpose for its
exclusion. However, there are at least two fundamental reasons
why such an omission probably is not significant. First, on the basis
"N.C. GEm. STAT. § 146-64(4) (1964).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-12 (1964).
7"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-64(9) (1964) provides that:
'Vacant and unappropriated lands' means all State lands title to
which is vested in the State as sovereign, and land acquired by the
State by virtue of being sold for taxes, except swamp lands as herein-
after defined.5 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-64(8) (1964).
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of reports referred to in previous portions of this study, it is prob-
ably safe to say that there is little, if any, of this land which has not
already been granted by the State. Second, so long as these lands do
not fall within the definition of swamp lands, they must come within
the definition of vacant and unappropriated lands. The only remain-
ing difficulty is that all proceeds from the sale of such lands must, in
accordance with the state Constitution, go to the support of the com-
mon schools rather than into the State Land Fund.
The 1965 General Assembly enacted a comprehensive revision of
the laws in another relevant area. The act, among other things, dealt
with oyster and clam leases and established the procedures for lease
applications, methods for the survey of oyster and clam beds, and
maximum and minimum area limitations of leased bottoms.70 It
also provided for termination and renewal of outstanding leases
with increased rentals. The rental alteration, however was held
unconstitutional in Oglesby v. Adams, a 1966 decision of the North
Carolina Supreme Court.77 In 1953, Oglesby had obtained a twenty
year lease of ten acres at an annual rate of fifty cents per acre for
for the first ten years and one dollar per acre for the second ten
years; the lease was renewable upon its expiration for successive ten
year periods upon the terms applying in the last ten years of the
lease. The 1965 act permitted a charge of five dollars per acre and
would have terminated the lease on April 1, 1967. The court held
that the statutory alteration of the annual rental was an unconstitu-
tional abrogation of the State's contract with Oglesby even though
Oglesby could claim no vested right in the provisions of the prior
statute, but the court did not rule directly upon that part of the
statute altering the term of the lease and its renewability. It probably
may be assumed that the lease term is as much an inviolable element
of the contract as the annual rental rate under the interpretation
made in the case of State v. Spencer.8 Spencer, pursuant to Chap-
ter 119 of the Laws of 1887, had obtained a perpetual franchise for
an oyster bed beneath the waters surveyed by Winslow. He suc-
cessfully defended against a prosecution for violation of an 1893
statute which declared that the same lands were not subject to entry.
The court declared that "rights of property have been acquired
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-202 (Supp. 1967).
268 N.C. 272, 150 S.E.2d 383 (1966).
T 114 N.C. 770, 19 S.E. 93 (1894).
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which the State itself cannot take away except after compensation
and under the principle of eminent domain."17
The 1965 statute also contains a registration provision pertain-
ing to all claims of title to lands lying beneath navigable waters and
"any right of fishery in navigable waters superior to that of the gei-
eral public." All such claims must be registered with the Commis-
sioner of Commercial and Sports Fisheries on or before January 1,
1970; titles and rights not registered by that time are null and void. 0
The 1967 General Assembly enacted two statutes in response to
the Oglesby decision. First, in Chapter 88 of the 1967 Session Laws,
the Assembly repealed the 1965 legislation concerning oyster and
clam leases. Then, in Chapter 876, it proceeded to adopt a revised
scheme of lease regulation. The revised regulations omitted the in-
validated rental alteration as well as the provisions terminating ex-
isting leases and the requirement for bottom surveys to accompany
renewals of those leases. Various other procedural changes were
made, but the registration provision pertaining to claims to titles
to underwater lands was not affected. Brunswick County was ex-
empted from the revised leasing regulations, thus leaving this single
county outside of lease controls applicable to other coastal areas.
The constitutionality of this exemption may be vulnerable to attack
as an exclusive or separate emolument or privilege under Article I,
Section 7 of the North Carolina Constitution, or conceivably as a for-
bidden type of special or local legislatioh under Article II, Section
29 of the North Carolina Constitution.
THE NAVIGABILITY DOCTRINE
AND ESTAURINE LAND OWNERSHIP
Introduction
Throughout the preceding disussion of estuarine land grants
78 Id. at 780, 19 S.E. at 96.
so N.C. GEN. STAT. § I13-205 (i966). This statute mha; be subject to
attack as having the effect of taking property without due process of law.
Registration statutes do not usually make unregistered deeds void as between
the grantor and grantee, but only preclude assertion of title by'a grantee
against creditors and purchasers for value. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 47-18 (1950) and Patterson v. Bryant, 216 N.C. 550, 5 S.E.2d 849 (1939).
It has, moreover, been held under pre-1965 statutes that a grant from the
State is not void if not registered even where the action concerns the claim
of a junior grantee who has recorded his grant. North Carolina Mining Co.
v. Westfeldt, 151 F. 290 (4th Cir. 1907). The retroactive operation of the
new statute conjures up recollections of the court's decision in State v.
Spencer, 114 N.C. 770, 19 S.E. 93 (1894).
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in North Carolina, there has been repeated reference to the prohibi-
tion upon private ownership of lands beneath navigable waters.
It has been seen that the English common law is the source of the
rule reserving title to jus publicum land to the State as trustee for its
citizens and that the jus publicum lands of England were those
lying beneath royal waters, those waters in which the tide ebbed
and flowed. This section traces the history of the jus publicum
land concepts as an element of the land law of this State in order to
provide a greater understanding of the refinements of the common
law principles for those who may be faced with the necessity of
evaluating claims of title to submerged North Carolina lands.
Early Development of the Law
The basic distinction between jus privatuin and jits publicum
title of the Crown was well established prior to the settlement of
North America. Lands beneath waters in which the tide ebbed and
flowed belonged to the people of England as common owners and
the King held title to such lands in trust for his subjects. In The
Royal Fishery of the Banne,s1 the court indicated that this basic
principle applied to rivers and other arms of the sea in which the
tide ebbed and flowed as well as to the coastal waters of the King-
dom and, in 1805, the leading early American case of Palmer v.
Mulligans2 relied heavily upon the Royal Fishery case in holding
that the ebb and flow, or tidal, rule applied in a controversy concern-
ing the lands and waters of the Hudson River in New York. Chan-
cellor Kent, however, was careful to note in his opinion that
though the land beneath the waters of the river might be privately
owned, the waters themselves were public so far as they were actually
navigable. The decision was completely in accord with the law of
England83 as were the early North Carolina cases."4
Although there were no decisions in North Carolina prior to
1828 in which the court clearly articulated the navigability doctrine
of the State, recent estuarine land decisions have suggested that the
common law tidal rule was followed at one time.8" This theory is at
81 Davis 55, 80 Eng. Rep. 540 (P.C. 1610) (Ire.).
823 Caines 207, 2 Am. Dec. 270 (N.Y. 1805).
"See, e.g., Blount v. Layard, [1891] 2 Ch. 681; Leconfield v. Lonsdale,
L.R. 5 C.P. 665 (1870).
"See, e.g., Hodges v. Williams, 95 N.C. 331, 335 (1886); State v.
Glen, 52 N.C. 321, 333 (1859).
" Swan Island Club, Inc. v. White, 114 F. Supp. 95, 98 (E.D.N.C. 1953),
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least impliedly supported by the analysis of the earliest cases, none
of which suggests that the court even considered modifying or aban-
doning the common law rule. Though none of them expressly articu-
lated the tidal rule, the use of language reminiscent of that em-
ployed in the English cases and in Palmer v. Mulligan was not un-
common.8" All of these cases, however, involved lands beneath tidal
waters so that it was not necessary for the court to consider the
broader implications of adopting the ebb and flow navigability doc-
trine until 1828. Wilson v. Forbes,8 7 raised for the first time a dis-
pute over ownership of land covered by non-tidal waters commonly
used for navigation by sea vessels. In his opinion for the court, Judge
Henderson spoke to the problem in stating that:
It is clear that by the rule adopted in England, navigable
waters are distinguished from others, by the ebbing and flowing of
the tides. But this rule is entirely inapplicable to our situation,
arising both from the great length of our rivers, extending far
into the interior, and the sand-bars and other obstructions at their
mouths. By that rule, Albemarle and Panmlico sounds, which are
inland seas, would not be deemed navigable waters, and would be
the subject of private property. What general rule shall be
adopted, this case does not require me to determine.... But I
think it must be admitted that a creek or river, such as this ap-
pears to be, wide and deep enough for sea vessels to navigate, and
without any obstruction to this navigation from its mouth to the
ocean ... is a navigable stream within the general rule.88
Although it is apparent that Judge Henderson did not intend to
formulate a rigid rule in Wilson v. Forbes, the phrase "wide and
deep enough for sea vessels to navigate" was echoed fourteen years
later in Collins v. Benburys9 when the court announced the rule that
"any waters, which are sufficient to afford a common passage for all
people in sea vessels, are to be taken as navigable... ."" Both Wilson
and Collins were cases dealing with non-tidal waters so that even
after 1842 there might have been some doubt as to the applicability
aff'd sub wom., Swan Island Club, Inc. v. Yarborough, 209 F.2d 698 (4th
Cir. 1954); Development Co. v. Parmele, 235 N.C. 689, 695, 71 S.E.2d
474 (1952).
' See, e.g., Tatum v. Sawyer, 9 N.C. 226 (1822); McKenzie's Ex'rs
v. Hulet, 4 N.C. 613 (1818).
" 13 N.C. 30 (1828).
88 Id. at 34-35.
"25 N.C. 277 (1842).
'IOd. at 282.
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of the new sea vessel rule to tidal waters. The distinction, however,
cannot explain the 1846 decision in Hatfield v. Grimnsted.Y' There
the court, without reference to any supporting precedents includ-
ing Wilson and Collins, sustained an 1839 grant of lands lying be-
neath the non-tidal waters of Currituck Sound by employing the
ebb and flow concept of navigable waters which arguably it had
previously discarded. Subsequent decisions of the court have limited
the Hatfield case on the ground that the court had resorted to the
common law rule because of the General Assembly's failure in 1837
to retain those provisions of the prior laws pertaining to the method
for survey of lands lying on navigable waters. The subsequent
1847 amendment of the 1837 entry and grant laws effectively limited
the applicability of Hatfield to grants made by the State between the
effective dates of the 1837 revisal and the 1847 statutory amend-
ment. 2
The Wilson formulation of the navigability doctrine was relied
upon once again in State v. Glen.93 Glen's conviction under an in-
dictment charging him with failure to remove a dam obstructing the
passage of fish in the Yadkin River was reversed by the Supreme
Court which held that (1) the Yadkin River was non-navigable
under the sea vessel rule, (2) Glen's claim of title to the river bot-
tom was valid and entitled him to construct the dam, and (3) the
State could not force Glen to remove his dam absent just compen-
sation from the State for his attendant losses. In reaching the first
of these conclusions, the court examined the facts of the case in light
of the rule that:
... any waters, whether sounds, bays, rivers, or creeks, which are
wide enough and deep enough for the navigation of sea vessels,
are navigable waters, the soil under which is not the subject of
entry and grant under our entry law. . . . In streams not
navigable the bed of the river may be, under the general entry
law, the subject of a grant to a private individual .... 94
This suggests that the sea vessel rule of Wilson and Collins was, as
to grants not made between 1837 and-1847, to be applied at least
in those cases involving non-tidal waters. It may be implied from the
-- 29 N.C. 139 (1846).92 See, e.g., Development Co. v. Parmele, 235 N.C. 689, 695, 71 S.E.2d
474, 479 (1952) ; Bond v. Wool, 107 N.C. 139, 149, 12 S.E. 281, 285 (1890).
- 52 N.C. 321 (1859).
0, Id. at 325.
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language used by the court that the North Carolina sea vessel doc-
trine of navigability applied to tidal as well as non-tidal waters, but
a subsequent summary of the State law in Glen clearly raised some
doubt about whether the common law tidal rule had been completely
discarded. In its summary, the court stated in part that "[a]ll the
bays and inlets on our coast, where the tide from the sea ebbs and
flows, and all other waters, whether sounds, rivers, or creeks, which
can be navigated by sea vessels, are called navigable, in a technical
sense, are altogether publici juris, and the soil under then cannot be
entered and a grant taken for it under the entry law." '95 Neither Wil-
son, Collins nor Glen involved the application of the navigability doc-
trine to tidal waters and tidelands; each applied the sea vessel rule to
controversies over title to lands beneath non-tidal waters. Thus, in
1859, the State was still without an explicit judicial statement of the
doctrine of navigability applicable to grants purporting to convey
title to land beneath tidal waters.
Development, 1859-1967
The court was not faced with another title controversy involving
the navigability doctrine until 1886. Holding that lands lying be-
neath the non-tidal waters of Mattamuskeet Lake had been lawfully
entered and granted, the court reaffirmed the sea vessel navigability
doctrine in Hodges v. Williams.9 The decision was based upon the
triad of cases discussed in the preceding section, but reference was
made to State v. Glen for its statement of the sea vessel rule rather
for its summary of the law.97 Hodges, however, still left the law
without a decision as to the rule to be applied in determining the
navigability of tidal waters, a void which remained until 1938.
Since Glen and Hodges, in a series of decisions involving the
right of navigability in non-title cases the court has applied a test of
navigability in fact for any legitimate purpose of travel or trade-
including use by fishing boats and freight batteaux or rafting of logs
or produce.9" Indeed, the court has gone so far as to quote with
favor language from other jurisdictions accepting a pleasure boating
°5 Id. at 333.
9095 N.C. 331 (1886).
°7 Id. at 334.
"
8Taylor v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 262 N.C. 452, 137 S.E.2d
833 (1964); State v. Twiford, 136 N.C. 603, 48 S.E. 586 (1904); State
v. Baum, 128 N.C. 600, 38 S.E. 900 (1901); Broadnax v. Baker, 94 N.C.
675 (1886).
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test of navigability. 9  Insurance Co. v. Parmele ° finally compelled
the court to decide whether or not the waters of a tidal sound were
navigable within the meaning of the law pertaining to land titles.
In finding that two tracts of salt marsh in Myrtle Grove Sound were
properly conveyed under a 1930 deed from the State Board of Edu-
cation, the court rejected the common law ebb and flow test and
followed the sea vessel test developed in Wilson, Collins, Glen and
HodgesY'0 The decision of the court became the first clear repudia-
tion of the English doctrine in a case concerning waters subject to the
ebb and flow of the tides; it was reaffirmed just seven years later in
Kelly v. King,'0 2 a trespass case which again involved lands lying
beneath the waters of Myrtle Grove Sound.
The apparent clarity of the navigability doctrine after the de-
cisions in Insurance Co. and Kelly lasted only until 1952 when the
decision in Development Co. v. Parmele'0 3 produced great con-
fusion in the law. Rather than discuss the navigability doctrine
as evolved in estuarine land title cases, the court quoted freely and at
random from both the title cases and the obstruction of navigation
cases and concluded that all water courses are "navigable" that are
navigable in fact.' The common law distinction between the mean-
ing of "navigable waters" as used in the two types of cases has al-
ready been pointed out in the discussion of Palmer v. Mulligan.'"5
Prior to Development Co. v. Parmele, the North Carolina courts
carefully articulated and adhered to the common law principles which
distinguished between the two types of cases, extending the ease-
ment for navigation to all waters usable by any boats in commerce
while confining the application of the doctrine preserving jus publi-
cur lands to the smaller class of waters capable of navigation by sea
', State v. Twiford, 136 N.C. 603, 608, 48 S.E. 586, 588 (1904).
100 214 N.C. 63, 197 S.E. 714 (1938).
101 Alternate formulations of the test of navigability in this case in-
cluded: "commerce of a substantial and permanent character," and waters
which are "navigable in fact and which by themselves or their connection
with other waters form a continuous channel for commerce with foreign
countries or among the states." Id. at 68.10-225 N.C. 709, 36 S.E.2d 220 (1945).
10. 235 N.C. 689, 71 S.E.2d 474 (1952). The case involved marsh lands
in the Town of Wrightsville Beach which were bounded by a causeway on
one side and shallow sloughs on the remaining three sides.10 1 d. at 695, 71 S.E.2d at 479. Some of the principal "obstruction of
navigation" cases are State v. Twiford, 136 N.C. 603, 48 S.E. 586 (1904);
State v. Baum, 128 N.C. 600, 38 S.E. 900 (1901) ; Commissioners v. Lumber
Co., 116 N.C. 731, 21 S.E. 941 (1894).
"o See notes 26, 27, 83 supra, and accompanying text.
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vessels.'0 6 Development Co. v. Parmele overlooked this distinction,
applied the broader rule, and concluded that the water covering the
marsh only at high tide was navigable water.
After Development. Co. v. Parmele, there was at least no longer
any real question about whether the North Carolina navigability doc-
trine was the ebb and flow rule or some other judicially developed
refinement of the common law. As a matter of fact, the courts
agreed on one point in all of the tide-flow estuarine land cases begin-
ning with Insurance Co. v. Parmele. That one point of agreement
concerned the inapplicability of the common law tidal rule of navi-
gable waters. But Development Co. v. Parmele introduced a new
point for debate through its random reference to the land title and
the navigation case-law doctrines; the confusion thereby brought to
the law was compounded when the court failed to indicate which of
the rules it applied in concluding that the waters covering the salt
marshes at high tide were navigable. The ensuing confusion in the
law is readily apparent in the two estuarine land cases decided in
the two years immediately following Development Co. v. Parmele.
Neither Swan Island Club v. White °7 nor Parmele v. Eaton0 s in any
way mentioned the sea vessel navigability rule of Wilson v. Forbes.
Instead, they relied solely upon the obstruction of navigation quo-
tations and references appearing in the Development Co. v. Parmele
opinion in their discussions of the North Carolina navigability doc-
trine. Swan Island is the more instructive of the two cases as to
the potential impact of the new line of cases for in that case the Fed-
eral District Court held that the shoal land around an island in the
shallow waters of Currituck Sound were navigable waters in the
real property sense even though the waters could be used at high
tide only by small boats; the water was so shallow that it could not
be used even by small boats at high tide when there was a strong
and steady northeast wind. Nevertheless, after rejecting the ap-
plicability of the ebb and flow rule, the court held that the waters
were "navigable in fact" and concluded that the lands beneath them
had been unlawfully granted. The "navigable in fact" approach of
Swan Island was brought to bear again in Parmele v. Eaton wherein
the court (finding a portion of the marsh involved in the previous
... Cases cited note 84 supra.
10? 114 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.N.C. 1953).
108 240 N.C. 539, 83 S.E.2d 93 (1954).
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case of Development Co. v. Parmele to be non-navigable) declared
that the applicable rule in estuarine land title cases "is that all water
courses are regarded as navigable in law that are navigable in fact,"
and that the practical test is "whether, in its ordinary state, the water
has capacity and suitability for the usual purpose of navigation by
vessels or boats as are employed in the ordinary course of water
commerce, trade and travel."10 9 Essentially the same definition-
"navigable in fact"-appears again in the 1959 State Land Acts
where for the first time the definition of "navigable waters" is made
a part of the statutes;110 this statement of the rule conforms, at
least in verbal formulation, more closely than does the sea vessel
rule to the rule applied in the majority of states.11
It may be that, by a combination of the enactment of this statute
and the gradual evolution of judicial decisions, a single test of navig-
ability in North Carolina has now become the law: navigability in
fact by any form of vessel or water transport common to the times.
In its most recent decisions the court may have sounded the death
knell of the seagoing vessel test for all practical purposes, just as it
previously abandoned the ebb and flow rule-albeit, in its customary
reluctance to expressly overrule prior decisions, it has not explicitly
abandoned the seagoing test. However, the exact meaning of the
statutory standard will probably not be known until it is clarified
by further legislation or, more likely, by judicial interpretation of
the statute.
MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL PRINCIPLES
oF ESTUARINE OWNERSHIP AND USE
Ownership and Use of Estuarine Resources
Fish and wildlife resources in their natural state are owned by
the state in trust for its citizens.11 Shellfish are among these re-
sources and along with other fish and game are classified in law as
ferae naturae."' There is, however, an exception made concerning
109 Id. at 548, 83 S.E.2d at 99.
11 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-64(4) (1964).
""See, e.g., CLARK §§ 41.2(B) n.72, 42.2(B) n.27 and cases cited
therein. North Carolina was recognized in 1904 as being the only state with
the sea vessel limitation on the "commercial usage" doctrine of navigability.
FARNHAM § 23g, at 118.
"Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1893).
11 State v. Taylor, 27 N.J.L. 117 (Sup. Ct. 1858); People v. Morrison,
194 N.Y. 175, 86 N.E. 1120 (1893); Coos Bay Oyster Co. v. State, 219 Ore.
588, 348 P.2d 39 (1959).
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planted shellfish which are domitae naturae. This exception to the
general rule arises because the ferae naturae classification results
primarily from the migratory character and the natural habitat of
wild fish and game. Shellfish are not, however, migratory so that
when they are planted in artificial beds they do not satisfy either of
the primary requisites of ferae naturae treatment at law.114 Perae
vaturae fish and animals are, as noted above, owned by the people
of the state and the state holds title to them in trust for the public.
Domestic fish and animals (domitae naturae) are, on the other hand,
the private property of the owner, e.g., the planter of shellfish, and
interference with that personal property right will form the basis for
a legal cause of action.1 5 Thus, unlike wild fish and game which
become private property only when reduced to possession, domitae
naturae are always private property and are not subject to claim by
the state on behalf of the public absent appropriate compensation
to the individual owner.
Bottoms in which private persons plant shellfish in North Caro-
lina may be obtained by leases from the state or may be salt marshes
owned by the individuals planting the shellfish. The lease situation
is an example of the General Assembly's power to grant a fishery
in public waters to a private person. 16 The shellfish lease statutes,
along with several other statutes creating and preserving private
rights of fishery,11 7 provide the sole means for acquiring a private
fishery in the public waters of North Carolina. Despite the language
in Collins v. Benbury indicating that a several or exclusive fishery
may be claimed either by the owner of the soil of a watercourse or
by one who has a grant of fishery from the owner of the soil,"1 it
is now clear that the public waters of North Carolina extend to
watercourses whose beds are privately owned. Thus, the statutes
preserve and regulate the common right of fishery in all waters
within the State except private ponds." 9 Although, as already noted
above, a private right of fishery in the public waters of the State
.' Cases cited note 113 supra.
"" Cases cited note 113 supra.
.. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1893) (succession of state legis-
latures to the powers of Parliament in this area). See also Collins v. Ben-
bury, 25 N.C. 277, 283 (1842); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-202 (1967) (oyster
and clam leases).
""See, e.g., N.C. Laws 1874-75, ch. 183, § 3.
11825 N.C. 277, 283 (1842).
'
10N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113-129, -182, -292 (1966).
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may still be acquired in accordance with specific statutory exceptions
to the general prohibition against such rights, the interests obtained
pursuant to the provisions of the statutory exceptions are circum-
scribed by both statutes and judicial decisions. Under common law
principles, one who has a right under the statutes to an exclusive
fishery around his fishing pier can effectively protect that right only
in an action for trespass upon the area but may not claim an en-
forcible or protectable interest in the fish as such, since ferae 11aturae
fish and game belong to no single citizen of the State until such time
as they are in his physical possession and control.120 This principle
does not, however, apply to shellfish leases due to the combined effect
of two other principles, one statutory and one common law, concern-
ing the acquisition of this particular exclusive interest.
The statutes providing for the issuance of shellfish leases ex-
pressly prohibit the acquisition of a lease to natural oyster or clam
beds by a private party.12 1 It is, therefore, necessary for the lessee
to plant oysters within his leased bed. The protectable interest in
such a situation is two fold: the lessee, (1) like the possessor of any
other private right of fishery has a real property interest which is
protectable against trespass and, (2) because of the domitae naturae
legal classification of shellfish, has a personal property interest in the
oysters which is protectable at law. In other words, the lessee of a
shellfish bed may bring an action for injury to his planted oysters
as well as an action for trespass to his leasehold12 2 even though the
holder of an exclusive grant of fishery does not generally have legal
recourse for damages based upon the value of the fish taken from
his fishery.
Ownership of Land Between the High and Low Water Marks
McKenzie's Executors v. Hulet2 3 upheld a deed which granted
oyster rocks lying between the high and low water marks of a shallow
tidal sound in connection with a grant of adjacent land. As a result
of the decision an early precedent was established in North Carolina
supporting the proposition that such lands could be conveyed by a
grant which clearly expressed an intention to do so. McKenzie,
See, e.g., State v. Glen, 52 N.C. 321, 327 (1859).
"'E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-202 (Supp. 1967). See aso N.C. Laws
1858-59, ch. 33, § 2 (first oyster bed licensing statute).
... Cases cited note 113 supra.
1234 N.C. 613 (1818).
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however, has never been cited or relied upon as precedent for any
subsequent decision even though the issue of ownership of land
between the high and low water marks has since been considered
by the court. Moreover, the U. S. Supreme Court has held that the
states are powerless to grant a fee simple title to lands beneath
navigable waters even where the grantee, a public utility, is itself
"affected with a public interest."' 24 Although McKenzie has never
been relied upon by the court as authority for the proposition that
land between the high and low water mark could be conveyed by
specific state grant, the decision of the court in Ward v. Willis.. in
1858 indicated that even though the plaintiff in that case could not
claim such land as an incident of riparian ownership land between
the high and low water marks could be conveyed by a specific grant.
This dictum was reflected in the summary of North Carolina law
set forth in State v. Glen 26 which has been quoted in subsequent
opinions of the court.
Ward v. Willis did, however, indicate in a dictum that even
though the land between high and low water could not be entered,
it could have been validly conveyed by a specific grant from the
State. The court, in support of this dictum, made reference to Sir
Henry Constable's Case,27 the English common law precedent relied
upon by the McKenzie court. The legal validity of this statement has
neither been questioned nor relied upon by the court, but its present
vitality is somewhat questionable. It has been said time and time
again in the decisions of the court that lands beneath navigable
waters of this State could not be entered 28 and, until 1959, the ex-
clusive means for acquiring title to all but marsh lands and tax title
lands was through compliance with the provisions of the entry and
grant laws. The 1959 statute prohibits the acquisition of anything
but an easement in lands lying beneath navigable waters. 29 Thus,
although the General Assembly succeeded to the powers of Parlia-
ment and could grant title to land below the high water mark of
navigable waters, 3 ° the statutes which it has enacted specifically
124 Illinois Cent. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
12551 N.C. 183 (1858).
52 N.C. 321 (1859).
275 Co. Rep. 106a, 77 Eng. Rep. 218 (K.B. 1601).
..
8 See, e.g., Development Co. v. Parmele, 235 N.C. 689, 71 S.E.2d 474
(1952); Insurance Co. v. Parmele, 214 N.C. 63, 197 S.E. 714, (1938).
.2 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 146-3, -12 (1964).
.. Note 17 supra.
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preclude its delegates in the agencies of the State from the exercise
of that power. However, since the ultimate limitation upon the
power of the legislature, the North Carolina Constitution, does not
foreclose the exercise of that power by the General Assembly, it
would be possible under the rationale of Sir Henry Constable's
Case, McKenzie v. Hulet, and Ward v. Willis for the General As-
sembly to grant lands beneath navigable waters, including land be-
tween the high and low water marks of a tidal water, if the deed of
grant specifically expressed an intention to convey such land.
Accretion, Reliction, Avulsion and Erosion
It was firmly established in North Carolina by 1820 that the
owner of land is entitled to the land built up at the edge of his prop-
erty by the gradual and imperceptible deposit of soil carried by an ad-
jacent watercourse.13' At common law this rule, and the corollary
rule that accretions resulting from sudden storm or flood-wrought
changes did not vest in the riparian owner, applied to both navigable
and non-navigable waters.'32 Similarly, the converse of each of these
principles, i.e., gradual erosion divesting title and sudden erosion
allowing reclamation, applied to lands situated on navigable and non-
navigable waters.' The law relating to land situated on navigable
waters was, however, changed somewhat by the 1959 State Lands
Act so that "[i] f any land is, by any process of nature. .. , raised
above the high water mark of any navigable water, title thereto shall
vest in the owner of that land which, immediately prior to the raising
of the land in question, directly adjoined the navigable water."',34 In
the case of erosion, the statute provides for reclamation of lands lost
as a result of any natural cause, 35 although all other lands raised
from navigable waters by any other means vest in the state if an
application to fill the area occupied by the raised land has not ob-
tained prior approval from the Department of Administration, Gov-
ernor and Council of State.'
36
... Murray v. Sermon, 8 N.C. 56 (1820).182 Id.
.
3 See Jones v. Turlington, 243 N.C. 681, 684, 92 S.E.2d 75, 77 (1956),
quoting with approval from 56 Am. JUR. Waters § 477, at 892 (1947).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6(a) (Supp. 1967).
"'
5N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6(b), (c) (Supp. 1967).




Although title to real property normally passes by deeds and
grants, title may also be acquired by adverse possession. The statutes
of North Carolina provide that the state may not assert a claim of
title to lands against one who bases a claim of title on (1) adverse
possession by the claimant, or those under whom he claims, for thirty
years if the claim is to land having known or visible lines or (2) ad-
verse possession by the claimant, or those under whom he claims,
under color of title for twenty-one years if the claim is to land
having known or visible lines or boundaries.13 7 Proof of title by
adverse possession requires actual possession of the land which is
open, visible and hostile to the interest of the title holder. 138 Occa-
sional use or occupancy of the land will not suffice3 9 nor will listing
and payment of taxes satisfy the legal requirements, 140 but possession
accompanied by clearing and improving the land,' cutting and
hauling away of timber and posting notices against trespass to a
swamp, 4 2 or the annual keeping of fish traps and the erection and
repair of a dam in non-navigable waters 43 is sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of actual and open possession. This is true regardless
of whether the alleged title is based upon the absolute thirty year
limitation or the twenty-one year color of title provision, since color
of title is relevant only with regard to fixing the applicable time
limitation.'4 4 For purposes of the statute, color of title is defined as
"a paper-writing (usually a deed) which professes and appears to
pass title, but fails to do so."' 145 Note, however, that a post-1893
grant of lands previously granted by the State or its predecessors
does not, under any circumstances, constitute color of title.' 6
The case law permits the State, along with any other persons,
"
7N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-35 (1953).
"I Newkirk v. Porter, 237 N.C. 115, 74 S.E.2d 235 (1953).
... Chisholm v. Hall, 255 N.C. 374, 121 S.E.2d 726 (1961).1 I0 !d.
1 Smith v. Bryan, 44 N.C. 180 (1852).
14- Alexander v. Richmond Cedar Works, 177 N.C. 137, 98 S.E. 312
(1919); Tredwell v. Redwick, 23 N.C. 56 (1840). Cf. Price v. Whisnant,
236 N.C. 381, 72 S.E.2d 851 (1952); McLean v. Smith, 106 N.C. 172, 11
S.E. 184 (1890). In the latter cases, frequency of use of the land was held
insufficient.
... Williams v. Buchanan, 23 N.C. 535 (1841).
." Cothran v. Motor Lines, 257 N.C. 782, 127 S.E.2d 578 (1962); Fara-
bow v. Perry, 222 N.C. 21, 25 S.E.2d 173 (1943).
1.. Smith v. Proctor, 139 N.C. 314, 51 S.E. 889 (1905).
"' N.C. GEr. STAT. § 146-39 (1964). See also N.C. Laws 1893, ch. 490.
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to acquire title by adverse possession under the provisions of the
statutes fixing the time limitations for actions between private per-
sons. A recent case confirming the capacity of the State to assert
such a claim, Williams v. State Board of Education,4 7 stated that:
.. . we know of no authority or reason by which the State of
North Carolina or its agencies are excluded from the right to
assert title by adverse possession when the circumstances would
permit a private litigant to do so.148
The circumstances of which the court speaks are established by a
section of the General Statutes which creates a twenty year limitation
for cases in which there is no color of title and a seven year limitation
for cases where possession is under color of title.140 In addition, of
course, the State must be able to prove that its possession was actual
as well as open, notorious and hostile to that of the title holder.
Deed Construction and
Legal Proceedings
The first question of an adverse party in a title controversy may
very well be "Is the deed valid?" In this regard, the substantive pro-
visions of the State land laws have already been examined. Deeds
or grants issued for lands other than those that could be lawfully
conveyed under the statutes were declared null and void by those
same statutes.150 In controversies over land purportedly conveyed,
it has been held that the original invalidity of a deed may be raised
in the legal proceedings.151 Assuming, however, that the deed ap-
pears on its face to be valid other issues of deed construction or, in
a very few cases fraud in procuring the deed, may present them-
selves for consideration. The issue of fraud also pertains to the
validity of the deed or grant although the facts creating invalidity
arise from the actions of the parties rather than from the subject
matter of the conveyance. The statutes of this state provide limited
remedies for both the Attorney General and private parties so far
1"7266 N.C. 761, 147 S.E.2d 381 (1966).
I" Id. at 766. The court stated in addition that "We are of the opinion and
so hold that the General Assembly intended that these statutes should apply
to any legal entity, including the State of North Carolina and its agencies,
capable of adversely possessing land and of acquiring title thereto." Id. at
766-67, 147 S.E.2d at 385.1 9 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-38 (1953).
.o See, e.g., N.C. Laws 1777, ch. 1, § VIII (2d Session).
... Janney v. Blackwell, 138 N.C. 437, 50 S.E. 857 (1905).
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as direct attack upon the validity of a deed or grant is concerned
and these remedies are confined to those cases in which fraud can
be demonstrated. Thus, for example, the Attorney General may
commence an action to have a deed or grant declared invalid only
(1) When he has reason to believe that such letters patent were
obtained by means of fraudulent suggestion or concealment of a
material fact ... ; or
(2) When he has reason to believe that such letters patent were
issued through mistake, or in ignorance of a material fact; or
(3) When he has reason to believe that the patentee, or those
claiming under him, have done or omitted an act in violation of
the terms and conditions on which the letters patent were granted,
or have by any other means forfeited the interest acquired under
the same.152
The state may bring an action under this section only on its own
behalf and only in cases in which title to the land would revest in
the state. 5 ' Although there has been no case in point, it is probably
this statute which provides the State with a legal remedy in situations
involving oyster and clam bed interests which were acquired under
earlier statutes but never perfected or preserved through compliance
with the various statutory provisions relating to the use and staking
out of the beds; this should be true at least with regard to the "per-
petual franchises" acquired through compliance with the procedures
established by the then prevailing entry and grant laws.
Although a deed may not be invalid for issuance in violation of
governing statutory provisions or for fraudulent procurement, it
may very well present issues concerning its proper construction. It
is not possible within the scope of this study to undertake an exten-
sive examination on this point, but it seems appropriate to note
some of the most basic principles of law and those particular con-
cepts which pertain directly to estuarine land controversies. In the
interpretation of deeds and other conveyances of real property, it
has long been the rule that the boundaries of the land are to be
determined by reference to natural monuments or marks if any
other specific or general description of the land contained in the
deed is inconsistent with the boundaries established by references to
'"
2N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-63 (1964).
... State v. Bland, 123 N.C. 739, 31 S.E. 475 (1898).
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natural markers.'54 This rule is of special importance to marsh land
controversies because the surveys of these lands were often tied to
natural objects such as trees, streams, etc. The application of this
rule and the rule that specific descriptions prevail over general de-
scriptions'55 are illustrated in part by some of the cases discussed
below.
A deed to land lying on a non-navigable water conveys, as a
general rule, both the land above the water and the bed of the stream
to its thread.' The specific limitation in a deed setting the boundary
on a tidal non-navigable water at the high water mark will, however,
operate to rebut the general rule and establish the boundary at the
high water mark instead of conveying the land to the thread of a
sound or other body of water. S And where a plat referred to in a
deed conflicts with the deed description of the boundary as the low
water mark of a non-navigable tidal sound by showing the boundary
to be the high water mark the plat will be incorporated into the
deed and establish the boundary at the low water mark.'58
The case discussed in the preceding paragraph, Kelly v. King,
highlights the significance of specific descriptions contained in deeds.
The principles applied in that case derive from a series of North
Carolina cases, many of which involve water-bounded land title
controversies. Thus, it has been held that a call to a particular point
of reference and "thence down the swamp" established the boundary
at the edge rather than the run of the swamp"5 9 although the term
"with the run of the swamp" will convey land to the center of the
swamp or the adjacent stream rather than to its banks.'10 These
cases, like Kelly v. King, involve references to marsh lands which
are natural boundaries' 0 ' and the particular phraseology used in the
respective deeds demonstrates the need for careful analysis of the
language of each individual deed which requires interpretation.
"'Batson v. Bell, 249 N.C. 718, 107 S.E.2d 562 (1959); Trust Co. v.
Miller, 243 N.C. 1, 89 S.E.2d 765 (1955).
' Whiteheart v. Grubbs, 232 N.C. 236, 60 S.E.2d 101 (1950).
Kelly v. King, 225 N.C. 709, 36 S.E.2d 220 (1945); Williams v.
Buchanan, 23 N.C. 535 (1845).Kelly v. King, 225 N.C. 709, 36 S.E.2d 220 (1945).
1
~Id.
... Rowe v. Cape Fear Lumber Co., 128 N.C. 301, 38 S.E. 896 (1901);
Hartsfield v. Westbrook, 2 N.C. 258 (1796).
...Rowe v. Cape Fear Lumber Co., 128 N.C. 301, 38 S.E. 896 (1901).
... Stapleford v. Brinson, 24 N.C. 311 (1842).
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State Power to Regulate the Use
of Estuarine Land and Resources
The capacity of the state to control the use of estuarine land
and resources varies in degree throughout the spectrum of state and
private real and personal property interests in the lands and re-
sources. On the one hand, state-owned land, waters, and the re-
sources therein are protectable to the fullest extent from injury as
real and personal property of the state.162 On the other hand, the
existence of a private interest in either estuarine lands or resources
will serve to limit, but not preclude, exercise of control by the state.
One example of the limitation upon State authority to regulate
the use of estuarine lands has already been highlighted in the earlier
discussion of Oglesby v. Adams and State v. Spencer, the cases re-
stricting the application of statutes impairing leasehold contracts
between the State and private parties.1683 A second limitation is based
on the constitutional prohibition against taking of property with-
out due process of law. For purposes of this brief synopsis, it may
be viewed as the substantive or economic due process bar against
the taking of property by the state without payment of just compen-
sation. In the final analysis, that was the problem before the court
in State v. Glen.'64 Although the state may exercise the police power
for the protection or promotion of the public health, safety, morals
or general welfare, it may not do so unreasonably or in an arbitrary
or discriminatory fashion0 5 and the taking of property without just
compensation is deemed at law to be unreasonable. 66
The courts of several states have considered the proper limits of
the legislative exercise of the police power in cases where the laws
enacted were designed to deal with estuarine resources and land
problems. In North Carolina, the statute making it unlawful to
discharge any poisonous or deleterious substance harmful to fish
"I N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-70 (1964) expressly provides that the Attorney
General shall represent the state in all actions brought by it with regard to
state lands or any interest therein. See, State Highway Comm'n v. Cobb,
215 N.C. 556, 2 S.E.2d 565 (1939) (concerning capacity of state to sue for
injury to property) (dictun).
... See 114 N.C. 770, 19 S.E. 93 (1894).
152 N.C. 321, 327 (1859). The appeal was from a conviction upon
an indictment charging failure to remove, at the state's request, a dam built
in a non-navigable stream at a point of the stream where Glen owned the
banks on both sides.
... State v. Glidden Co., 228 N.C. 664, 46 S.E.2d 860 (1948).
O" Durham County v. Addison, 262 N.C. 280, 136 S.E.2d 600 (1964).
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into the waters of the State-a predecessor of the state's present
water pollution control legislation-was upheld in the face of a
due process of law attack but was found to make an arbitrary dis-
crimination to the extent that all companies chartered prior to the
enactment of the statute were exempted from its provisions.10 7 In
Massachusetts, an act requiring a permit for dredging in marsh
lands survived a due process claim of invalidity although the
court cautioned that the conditions and restrictions put into the
permit by the state could not so limit the use of the property as to
amount to its taking without compensation."' The kinds of restric-
tions that may amount to a taking of property are indicated by a
recent Connecticut decision, which invalidated a town flood plain
zoning ordinance.'69 The land affected by the ordinance was tidal
marshland, 91 per cent of which was periodically flooded by a tidal
estuary, and the remainder of which had been inundated by extraordi-
nary floods of record. The stricken ordinance would have limited the
use of this land to open space uses, such as parks and playgrounds,
landings and docks, wildlife sanctuaries, farming, and vehicle park-
ing, unless a special exception was obtained. These restrictions upon
profitable use of undeveloped land were held to be unreasonable and
confiscatory as to property, some of which was under contract for
residential development and some of which had been assessed for
a sewer line.
... State v. Glidden Co., 228 N.C. 664, 46 S.E.2d 860 (1948).18 Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 349 Mass.
104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965).
... Dooley v. Town Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964).
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